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ABSTRACT
We propose a new type of adversarial attack to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for image classification.
Different from most existing attacks that directly perturb input pixels. Our attack focuses on perturbing
abstract features, more specifically, features that denote styles, including interpretable styles such
as vivid colors and sharp outlines, and uninterpretable ones. It induces model misclassfication by
injecting style changes insensitive for humans, through an optimization procedure. We show that
state-of-the-art adversarial attack detection and defense techniques are ineffective in guarding against
feature space attacks.
1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks are a prominent threat to the broad
application of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). In the
context of classification applications, given a pre-trained
model M and a benign input x of some output label y,
adversarial attack perturbs x such that M misclassifies
the perturbed x. The perturbed input is called adversarial
example. Such perturbations are usually bounded by some
distance norm such that they are not perceptible by humans.
Ever since it was proposed in [Szegedy et al., 2014], there
has been a large body of research that develops various
methods to construct adversarial examples, e.g., [Carlini
and Wagner, 2017, Madry et al., 2018], with different
modalities such as images [Carlini and Wagner, 2017],
audio [Qin et al., 2019], text [Ebrahimi et al., 2018], and
video [Li et al., 2019], detect adversarial examples [Tao
et al., 2018, Ma et al., 2019], and use adversarial examples
to harden the models [Madry et al., 2018, Zhang et al.,
2019].
However, most existing attacks are in the pixel space, that
is, the perturbations occur directly in the pixel space, and
the pixel level differences between the adversarial exam-
ple and the original input are bounded. In this paper, we
illustrate that adversarial attack can be conducted in the
feature space. The underlying assumption (in the context
of image classification) is that during training, a DNN may
extract a large number of abstract features. While many of
them denote critical characteristics of the object, some of
them are secondary, for example, the different styles of an
image (e.g., vivid colors versus pale colors, sharp outlines
versus blur outlines). These secondary features may play
an improperly important role in model prediction. As a
result, feature space attack can inject such secondary fea-
tures, which are not simple pixel perturbation, but rather
functions over the given benign input, to induce model
misclassification. Since humans are not sensitive to these
features, the resulted adversarial examples look very natu-
ral from humans’ perspective. As many of these features
are pervasive, the resulted pixel space perturbation may
be relatively much more substantial than existing pixel
space attacks. As such, pixel space detection and hard-
ening techniques are ineffective for feature space attacks
(see section 4). Figure 1 shows a number of adversarial
examples generated by our technique, their comparison
with the original examples, and the pixel space distances.
Observe that while the distances are much larger compared
to those in pixel space attacks, the adversarial examples
are completely natural, or even indistinguishable from the
original inputs in humans’ eyes. The contrast of the benign-
adversarial pairs illustrates that the malicious perturbations
largely co-locate with the primary content features, denot-
ing imperceptible tweaking of these features.
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(a) Spaniel
`∞=121/255
`2 =25.92
(b) Espresso
192/255
24.47
(c) Balloon
149/255
20.75
(d) Llama
183/255
28.55
(e) Printer
`∞= 252/255
`2= 21.80
(f) Lizard
225/255
40.88
(g) Guitar
216/255
25.60
(h) Race car
248/255
29.67
Figure 1: Examples by feature space attack. The top row
presents original images. The middle row denotes adversar-
ial samples. The third row shows the pixel-wise difference
(×3) between original images and adversarial samples.
The `∞ and `2 norms are shown on the bottom.
Under the hood, we consider that the activations of an inner
layer represent a set of abstract features, including those
primary and secondary. To avoid generating adversarial ex-
amples that are unnatural, we refrain from tampering with
the primary features (or content features) and focus on per-
turbing the secondary style features. Inspired by the recent
advance in style transfer [Huang and Belongie, 2017], the
mean and variance of activations are considered the style.
As such, we focus on perturbing the means and variances
while preserving the shape of the activation values (i.e., the
up-and-downs of these values and the relative scale of such
up-and-downs). We use gradient driven optimization to
search for the style perturbations that can induce misclas-
sification. Since our threat model is the same as existing
pixel space attacks, that is, the attack is launched by pro-
viding the adversarial example to the model. An important
step is to translate the activations with style changes back
to a naturally looking pixel space example. We address
the problem by considering the differences of any pair of
training inputs of the same class as the possible style dif-
ferences, and pre-training a decoder that can automatically
impose styles in the pixel space based on the style fea-
ture perturbation happening in an inner layer. We propose
two concrete feature space attacks, one to enhance styles
and the other to impose styles constituted from a set of
pre-defined style prototypes.
We evaluate our attacks on 3 datasets and 7 models. We
show that feature space attacks can effectively generate
adversarial samples that evade 7 state-of-the-art detec-
tion/defense approaches. Particularly, our proposed at-
tack can reduce the detection rate of a state-of-the-art ap-
proach [Roth et al., 2019] to 0.04% on the CIFAR-10
dataset, and the prediction accuracy of a model hardened
by a state-of-art adversarial training technique [Xie et al.,
2019] to 1.25% on ImageNet. Moreover, we observe that
despite the large distance introduced in the pixel space, the
distances in feature space are similar or even smaller than
those in `-norm based attacks. The generated adversarial
examples have only natural, and in many cases, human
imperceptible style differences compared with the original
inputs, demonstrating the practicality of the attacks. In
addition, we compare our technique with the most recent
attack on colors and texture Bhattad et al. [2020] and show
that our attack is more effective and natural (in humans’
eyes).
This work only demonstrates the feasibility of feature space
attacks. The features we are attacking are relatively simple.
In the future, we expect more research on complicated
feature space attacks.
2 Background and Related Work
Style Transfer. Huang and Belongie [2017] proposed to
transfer the style from a (source) image to another (tar-
get) that may have different content such that the content
of the target image largely retains while features that are
not essential to the content align with those of the source
image. Specifically, given an input image, say the por-
trait of actor Brad Pitt, and a style picture, e.g., a drawing
of painter Vincent van Gogh, the goal of style transfer
is to produce a portrait of Brad Pitt that looks like a pic-
ture painted by Vincent van Gogh. Existing approaches
leverage various techniques to achieve this purpose. Gatys
et al. [2016] utilized the feature representations in convo-
lutional layers of a DNN to extract content features and
style features of input images. Given a random white noise
image, the algorithm feeds the image to the DNN to obtain
the corresponding content and style features. The content
features from the white noise image are compared with
those from a content image, and the style features are con-
trasted with those from a style image. It then minimizes
the above two differences to transform the noise image to
a content image with style. Due to the inefficiency of this
optimization process, researchers replace it with a neural
network that is trained to minimize the same objective [Li
and Wand, 2016, Johnson et al., 2016]. Further study ex-
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tends these approaches to synthesize more than just one
fixed style [Dumoulin et al., 2017, Li et al., 2017]. Huang
and Belongie [2017] introduced a simple yet effective ap-
proach, which can efficiently enable arbitrary style transfer.
This approach proposes an adaptive instance normaliza-
tion (AdaIN) layer that aligns the mean and variance of the
content features with those of the style features.
Adversarial Attacks. In the context of image classifica-
tion, given an input x, and a DNN model M(·), an adver-
sary produces a sample x′ such thatM(x′) 6=M(x). If the
output label y is chosen by the adversary in advance, then
it is called a targeted attack, i.e., M(x′)=y 6=M(x); Oth-
erwise, it is an untargeted attack. Existing attacks, targeted
or untargeted, adopt `-norm based metrics to measure the
magnitude of introduced perturbation (small values cor-
respond to little perceptibility to humans). Three `-norm
metrics are commonly used: `0, `2, and `∞. Specifically,
`0 metric gauges the number of pixels modified when intro-
ducing the perturbation. Let δ=x′−x be the perturbation,
`0 can be calculated using ‖δ‖0 =
∣∣{i|δi 6= 0}∣∣. The `2
metric is the Euclidean distance which measures the ag-
gregated pixel changes. It is computed with the following
equation: ‖δ‖2 =
√∑
i δ
2
i . The `∞ metric gauges the
maximum change among all the modified pixels. The mea-
surement of `∞ is processed with ‖δ‖∞ = maxi |δi|. All
three metrics are widely used as the standard measurement
for evaluating stealthiness of adversarial attacks [Carlini
and Wagner, 2017, Madry et al., 2018] and robustness of
DNN models [Xu et al., 2018, Ma et al., 2019]. In this
paper, however, we find that these traditional pixel-space
`-norm metrics do not fully reflect the stealthiness of fea-
ture space attacks. Figure 1 showcases adversarial samples
generated using our feature space attack. All the generated
samples have very large `∞ bound (>120/255), which is
at least 7.5 times larger than the commonly used bounds in
the literature of adversarial attacks [Kurakin et al., 2017,
Roth et al., 2019] (<16/255 on ImageNet dataset). The
`2 bound is more than 20, substantially larger than those
in the literature as well, i.e., less than 0.5 in [Rony et al.,
2019, Lecuyer et al., 2019a, Cohen et al., 2019]. However,
observe that the adversarial samples have very natural style
differences compared to the original inputs.
The exploration beyond `-norm based attacks is rising.
Hosseini and Poovendran [2018] proposed to modify the
HSV color space to generate adversarial samples. The
method transforms all pixels by a non-parametric function
uniformly. Differently, our feature space attack changes
colors of objects or background and the transformation
is learned from images of the same object with different
styles. It is hence more imperceptible. Laidlaw and Feizi
[2019] proposed to change the lighting condition and color
(like Hosseini and Poovendran [2018]) to generate adver-
sarial examples. Bhattad et al. [2020] generated adversarial
examples by modifying color and texture. The approach
relies on the performance of the colorization model. It may
generate unrealistic examples due to the large search space
for adversarial colors. Texture attack produces more no-
ticeable perturbation than colorization. While our feature
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Figure 2: Procedure of feature space adversarial attack.
Two phases are involved during the attack generation pro-
cess: (a) decoder training phase and (b) feature space attack
phase.
space attack implicitly learns to modify lighting condition,
color and texture, it is more general and capable of trans-
forming subtle (and uninterpretable) features (discussed
in Section 4.5). Unlike in Song et al. [2018], where a
vanilla GAN-based attack method generates samples over
a distribution of limited support, and has no control of
the generated samples, our encoder-decoder based struc-
ture enables attacking individual samples with controlled
content and there is no limit on the number of samples.
3 Feature Space Attack
Overview. We aim to demonstrate that perturbation in the
feature space can lead to model misbehavior, which ex-
isting pixel space hardening techniques cannot effectively
defend against. The hypothesis is that during training, the
model picks up numerous features, many of which do not
describe the key characteristics (or content) of the object,
but rather human imperceptible features such as styles.
These subtle features may play an improperly important
role in model prediction. As a result, injecting such fea-
tures to a benign image can lead to misclassification. How-
ever, the feature space is not exposed to attackers such that
they cannot directly perturb features. Therefore, a promi-
nent challenge is to derive the corresponding pixel space
mutation that appears natural to humans while leading to
the intended feature space perturbation, and eventually the
misclassification. In particular, the attack comprises two
phases: (1) training a decoder that can translate feature
space perturbation to pixel level changes that look natural
for humans; (2) launching the attack by first using gradient
based optimization to identify feature space perturbation
that can cause misclassification and then using the decoder
to generate the corresponding adversarial example. In-
spired by style transfer techniques, we consider a much
confined feature perturbation space – style perturbation.
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Specifically, as in [Huang and Belongie, 2017], we con-
sider the mean and variance of the activations of an inner
layer denote the style of the features in that layer whereas
the activations themselves denote the content features. We
hence perturb the mean and variance of content features
by performing a predefined transformation that largely pre-
serves the shape of the features while changing the mean
and variance. The decoder then decodes the perturbed
feature values to an image closely resembles the original
image with only style differences that appear natural to
humans but causing model misclassification.
Figure 2 illustrates the workflow of the proposed attack. In
the Decoder training phase (a), a set of image pairs with
each pair from the same class (and hence their differences
can be intuitively considered as style differences) are fed
to a fixed Encoder that essentially consists of the first a
few layers of a pre-trained model (e.g., VGG-19) (step 1©).
The Encoder produces the internal embeddings of the two
respectively images, which correspond to the activation
values of some inner layer in the pre-trained model, e.g.,
conv4_1 (step 2©). Each internal embedding consists of a
number of matrices, one for every channel. For each em-
bedding matrix, the mean and variance are computed. We
use these values from the two input images to produce the
integrated embedding A© (step 3©), which will be discussed
in details later in this section. Intuitively, it is generated by
performing a shape-preserving transformation of the upper
matrix so that it retains the content features denoted by the
upper matrix while having the mean and variance of the
lower matrix (i.e., the style denoted by the lower matrix).
We employ a Decoder to reconstruct a raw image from A©
at step 4©, which is supposed to have the content of the
upper image (called the content image) and the style of
the lower image (called the style image). To enable good
reconstruction performance, two losses are utilized for op-
timizing the Decoder. The first one is the content loss.
Specifically, at step 5© the reconstructed image is passed
to the Encoder to acquire the reconstructed embedding B©,
and then the difference between the integrated embedding
A© and the reconstructed embedding B© is minimized. The
second one is the style loss. Particularly, the means and
variances of a few selected internal layers of the Encoder
are computed for both the generated image and the origi-
nal style image. The difference of these values of the two
images is minimized. The Decoder optimization process is
conducted on the original training dataset of target model
M (under attack). Intuitively, the decoder is trained to un-
derstand the style differences so that it can decode feature
style differences to realistic pixel space style differences,
by observing the possible style differences.
When launching the attack ((b) in Figure 2), a test input
image is fed to the Encoder and goes through the same
process as in the Decoder training phase. The key differ-
ences are that only one input image is required and the
Decoder is fixed in this phase. Given a target model M
(under attack), the reconstructed image is fed to M at step
6© to yield prediction E©. As the attack goal is to induce
M to misclassify, the difference between prediction E© and
a target output label (different from E©) is considered the
adversarial loss for launching the attack. In addition, the
content loss between A© and B© is also included. The attack
updates the means and variances of embedding matrices at
step 7© with respect to the adversarial loss and style loss.
The final reconstructed image that induces the target model
M to misclassify is a successful adversarial sample.
3.1 Definitions
In this section, we formally define feature space at-
tack. Considering a typical classification problem, where
the samples x ∈ Rd and corresponding label y ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n} jointly obey a distribution D(x, y). Given
a classifier M : Rd → {0, 1, . . . , n} with parameter
θ. The goal of training is to find the best parameter
argmaxθ P(x,y)∼D[M(x; θ) = y]. Empirically, people
associate a continuous loss functionLM,θ(x, y), e.g. cross-
entropy, to measure the difference between the predic-
tion and the true label. And the goal is rewritten as
argminθ E(x,y)∼D[LM,θ(x, y)]. We use LM in short forLM,θ in the following discussion. In adversarial learning,
the adversary can introduce a perturbation δ ∈ S ⊂ Rd
into the natural samples (x, y) ∼ D. For a given sample
x with label y, an adversary chooses the most malicious
perturbation argmaxδ∈S LM (x+ δ, y) to make the clas-
sifier M predict incorrectly. Normally S is confined as an
`p-ball centered on 0. In this case, the `p norm of pixel
space differences measures the distance between adversar-
ial samples (i.e., x+ δ that causes misclassification) and
the original samples. Thus we refer to this attack model as
the pixel space attack. Most existing adversarial attacks
fall into this category. Different from adding bounded per-
turbation in the pixel space, feature space attack applies
perturbation in the feature space such that an encoder (to
extract the feature representation of the benign input) and
a decoder function (that translates perturbed feature values
to a naturally looking image that closely resembles the
original input in humans’ perspective).
Formally, consider an encoder function f : Rd → Re and
a decoder function f−1 : Re → Rd. The former encodes
a sample to an embedding b ∈ Re and the latter restores
an embedding back to a sample. A perturbation function
a ∈ A : Re → Re transforms a given embedding to
another. For a given sample x, the adversary chooses the
best perturbation function to make the model M predict
incorrectly.
max
a∈A
LM [f−1 ◦ a ◦ f(x), y]. (1)
Functions f and f−1 need to satisfy additional proper-
ties to ensure the attack is meaningful. We call them the
wellness properties of encoder and decoder.
Wellness of Encoder f . In order to get a meaningful em-
bedding, there ought to exist a well-functioning classifier
g based on the embedding, with a prediction error rate less
than δ1.
∃g : Re → {0, 1, . . . , n},P(x,y)∼D[g(f(x)) = y]
≥ 1− δ1, for a given δ1.
(2)
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In practice, this property can be easily satisfied as one
can construct g from a well-functioning classifier M , by
decomposing M =M2 ◦M1 and take M1 as f and M2 as
g.
Wellness of Decoder f−1. Function f−1 is essentially a
translator that translates what the adversary has done on
the embedding back to a sample in Rd. We hence require
that for all possible adversarial transformation a ∈ A,
f−1 ought to retain what the adversary has applied to the
embedding in the restored sample.
∀a ∈ A, let Ba = a ◦ f(x),
E(x,y)∼D||f ◦ f−1(Ba)−Ba||2
≤ δ2, for a given δ2.
(3)
This ensures a decoded (adversarial) sample induce the in-
tended perturbation in the feature space. Note that f−1 can
always restore a benign sample back to itself. This is equiv-
alent to requiring the identity function in the perturbation
function set A.
Given (f, f−1,A) satisfying the aforementioned proper-
ties, we define Equation 1 as a feature space attack. Under
this definition, pixel space attack is a special case of fea-
ture space attack. For an `p-norm -bounded pixel space
attack, i.e., S = {||δ||p ≤ }, we can rewrite it as a feature-
space attack. Let encoder f and decoder f−1 be an identity
function and let A = ∪||δ||p≤{a : a(m) =m+ δ}.
pixel space attack
def
= max
||δ||p≤
LM (x+ δ, y) = max
a∈A
LM [a(x), y]
= max
a∈A
LM [f−1 ◦ a ◦ f(x), y] def= Equation 1 .
(4)
One can easily verify the wellness of f and f−1. Note
that the stealthiness of feature space attack depends on
the selection of A, analogous to that the stealthiness of
pixel space attack depending on the `p norm. Next, we
demonstrate two stealthy feature space attacks.
3.2 Attack Design
3.2.1 Decoder Training
Our decoder design is illustrated in Figure 2a. It is inspired
by style transfer in [Huang and Belongie, 2017]. To train
the decoder, we enumerate all the possible pairs of images
in each class in the original training set and use these pairs
as a new training set. We consider each pair has the same
content features (as they belong to the same class) and
hence their differences essentially denote style differences.
By training the decoder on all possible style differences
(in the training set) regardless the output classes, we have
a general decoder that can recognize and translate arbitrary
style perturbation. Formally, given a normal image xp and
another image xq from the same class as xp, the training
process first passes them through a pre-trained Encoder f
(e.g., VGG-19) to obtain embeddings Bp = f(xp), Bq =
f(xq) ∈ RH·W ·C , where C is the channel size, and H
and W are the height and width of each channel. For each
channel c, the mean and variance are computed across the
spatial dimensions (step 2© in Figure 2a). That is,
µBc =
1
HW
H∑
h=1
W∑
w=1
Bhwc ,
σBc =
√√√√ 1
HW
H∑
h=1
W∑
w=1
(Bhwc − µBc)2 .
(5)
We combine the embeddings Bp, Bq from the two input
images using the following equation:
∀c ∈ [1, 2, ..., C], Boc = σBqc
(Bpc − µBpc
σBpc
)
+ µBqc , (6)
where Boc is the result embedding of channel c. Intuitively,
the transformation retains the shape of Bp while enforcing
the mean and variance of Bq. Bo is then fed to the De-
coder f−1 for reconstructing the image with the content
of xp and the style of xq (steps 3© & 4© in Figure 2a). In
order to generate a realistic image, the reconstructed image
is passed to Encoder f to acquire the reconstructed embed-
dingBr = f ◦f−1(Bo) (step 5©). The difference between
the combined embedding Bo and the reconstructed embed-
ding Br, called the content loss, is minimized using the
following equation during the Decoder training:
Lcontent = ||Br −Bo||2. (7)
In addition, some internal layers of Encoder f are selected,
whose means and variances (computed by Equation 5)
are used for representing the style of input images. The
difference of these values between the style image xq
and the reconstructed image xr, called the style loss, is
minimized when training the Decoder. It is defined as
follows:
Lstyle =
∑
i∈L
||µ(φi(xq))− µ(φi(xr))||2+∑
i∈L
||σ(φi(xq))− σ(φi(xr))||2,
(8)
where φi(·) denotes layer i of Encoder f and L the set of
layers considered. In this paper, L consists of conv1_1,
conv2_1, conv3_1 and conv4_1 for the ImageNet dataset,
and conv1_1 and conv2_1 for the CIFAR-10 and SVHN
datasets. µ(·) and σ(·) denote the mean and the vari-
ance, respectively. The Decoder training is to minimize
Lcontent + Lstyle.
3.2.2 Two Feature Space Attacks
Recall in the attack phase (Figure 2b), the encoder and
decoder are fixed. The style features of a benign image are
perturbed while the content features are retained, aiming
to trigger misclassification. The pre-trained decoder then
translates the perturbed embedding back to an adversarial
sample. During perturbation, we focus on minimizing two
loss functions. The first one is the adversarial loss LM
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whose goal is to induce misclassification. The second one
is similar to the content loss in the Decoder training (Equa-
tion 7). Intuitively, although the decoder is trained in a way
that it is supposed to decode with minimal loss, arbitrary
style perturbation may still cause substantial loss. Hence,
such loss has to be considered and minimized during style
perturbation.
With two different sets of transformationsA, we devise two
respective kinds of feature space attacks, feature augmen-
tation attack and feature interpolation attack. For feature
augmentation attack, attacker can change both the mean
and standard deviation of each channel of the benign em-
bedding independently. The boundary of increments or
decrements are set by `∞-norm under logarithm scale (to
achieve stealthiness). Specifically, given two perturbation
vectors τµ for the mean and τσ for the variance, both
have the same dimension C as the embedding (denoting
the C channels) and are bounded by , the list of possible
transformations A is defined as follows.
A = ∪||τσ||∞≤ and ||τµ||∞≤, τσ and τµ∈RC{
a : a(B)h,w,c = e
τσc (Bh,w,c − µBc) + eτ
µ
c µBc
}
(9)
Note that µB denotes the means of embedding B for the
C channels. The subscript c denotes a specific channel.
The transformation essentially enlarges the variance of the
embedding at channel c by a factor of eτ
σ
c and the mean
by a factor of eτ
µ
c .
For the feature interpolation attack, the attacker pro-
vides k images as the style feature prototypes. Let
Sµ,Sσ be the simplex determined by ∪i∈[1,2,...,k]µf(xi)
and ∪i∈[1,2,...,k]σf(xi) respectively. The attacker can mod-
ify the vectors of µB and σB to be any point on the simplex.
A = ∪σi∈Sσ,µi∈Sµ{
a : a(B)h,w,c = σi · Bh,w,c − µBc
σBc
+ µi
} (10)
Intuitively, it enforces a style constructed from an interpo-
lation of the k style prototypes.
Optimization. In pixel level attacks, two kinds of op-
timization techniques are widely used: Gradient Sign
Method, e.g., PGD [Madry et al., 2018], and using contin-
uous function, e.g. tanh, to approximate and bound `∞,
e.g., in C&W [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. However in
our context, we found these two techniques do not per-
form well. Using gradient sign tends to induce a large
content loss while using tanh function inside the feature
space empirically causes numerical instability. Instead, we
use the iterative gradient method with gradient clipping.
Specifically, We first calculate the gradient of loss L with
respect to variables (e.g., τµc and τ
σ
c ). The gradient is
then clipped by a constant related to the dimension of vari-
ables. ||∇L||∞ ≤ 10/
√
Dimension of variable. Then an
Adam optimizer iteratively optimizes the variables using
the clipped gradients.
4 Evaluation
We evaluate feature space attack on 3 widely used im-
age classification datasets and 7 state-of-the-art detec-
tion/defense approaches. All the target models (under
attack) used in the experiments are pre-trained or trained us-
ing the code provided by the detection/defense approaches.
We discuss how the detection/defense approaches perform
under `-norm based pixel space attack in comparison with
our feature space attack. Details are elaborated in the
remainder of the section.
4.1 Setup
Datasets. Three datasets are employed in the experi-
ments: CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky et al., 2009], ImageNet
[Russakovsky et al., 2015] and SVHN [Netzer et al., 2011].
CIFAR-10 is an object classification dataset, which con-
sists of 10 classes. ImageNet is one of the largest image
classification datasets and comprises 1,000 categories of
objects. SVHN is a real-world digital recognition dataset
with 10 classes of digits from 0 to 9.
Detection and Defense Approaches. We use 7 state-of-
the-art detection and defense approaches to demonstrate
the effectiveness of proposed feature space attack. Detec-
tion approaches aim to identify adversarial samples while
they are provided to a DNN. They often work as an add-on
to the model and do not aim to harden the model. We
use two state-of-the-art adversarial example detection ap-
proaches proposed by Roth et al. [2019] and Papernot and
McDaniel [2018] to test our attack. Defense approaches,
on the other hand, harden models such that they are robust
against adversarial example attacks. Existing state-of-the-
art defense mechanisms either use adversarial training or
certify a bound for each input image. We adopt 5 state-of-
the-art defense approaches in the literature [Madry et al.,
2018, Zhang et al., 2019, Xie et al., 2019, Song et al., 2019,
Lecuyer et al., 2019b] for evaluation.
Attack Settings. The two proposed feature space attacks
have similar performance on various experimental settings.
Unless otherwise stated, we use feature augmentation at-
tack as the default method. For the Encoder, we use VGG-
19 from the input layer up to the relu4_1 for ImageNet,
and up to relu2_1 for CIFAR-10 and SVHN . To launch at-
tacks, we set the `∞-norm of embedding, , in Equation 9
to ln(1.5) for all the untargeted attacks and ln(2) for all
the targeted attacks. We randomly select 1,000 images
to perform the attacks on ImageNet. For CIFAR-10 and
SVHN, we use all the inputs in the validation set.
4.2 Attack against Detection Approaches
We use two state-of-the-art adversarial sample detection
approaches “The Odds are Odd” (O2) [Roth et al., 2019]
1 and feature-space detection method “Deep k-Nearest
Neighbors” (DkNN) [Papernot and McDaniel, 2018] to
demonstrate how feature space attack can evade it.
1O2 is recently bypassed by Hosseini et al. [2019], where
the attacker already knows the existence of the defense. In our
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Table 1: O2 detection rate on normal inputs and adversarial
samples.
Dataset Model Accuracy
Detection Rate
Normal PGD Feature Space
CIFAR-10 ResNet-18 91.95 0.95 99.61 0.04
ImageNet ResNet-50 75.20 19.20 99.40 25.30
Table 2: DkNN detection rate on normal inputs and adver-
sarial samples.
Dataset Model Accuracy
Detection Rate
PGD Feature Space
CIFAR-10
CNN+MLP 53.93 3.92 1.95
ResNet-18 81.51 11.32 5.42
O2 detects adversarial samples by adding random noise to
input images and observing activation changing at a cer-
tain layer of a DNN. Specifically, O2 uses the penultimate
layer (before the logits layer) as the representation of input
images. It then defines a statistical variable that measures
pairwise differences between two classes computed from
the penultimate layer. The authors observed that adver-
sarial samples differ significantly from benign samples
regarding this variable when random noise is added. By
performing statistical test on this variable, O2 is able to
detect PGD attacks [Madry et al., 2018] with over 99%
detection rate on CIFAR-10 with bound `∞ = 8/255 and
on ImageNet with `∞ = 2/255. It also has over 90%
detection rate against PGD and C&W [Carlini and Wag-
ner, 2017] attacks under `2 metric on CIFAR-10. The `2
bounds were not given in the original paper [Roth et al.,
2019].
Table 1 shows the results of O2 on detecting different
input samples. The first two columns are the datasets and
models used for evaluation. The third column denotes
the prediction accuracy of models on normal inputs. The
following three columns present the detection rate of O2 on
normal inputs, PGD adversarial samples, and feature space
adversarial samples, respectively. The detection rate on
normal inputs indicates that O2 falsely recognizes normal
inputs as adversarial, which are essentially false positives.
We can observe that O2 can effectively detect PGD attack
on both datasets, but fails to detect feature space attack.
Particularly, O2 has only 0.04% detection rate on CIFAR-
10, which indicates that O2 is almost completely evaded
by feature space attack. As for ImageNet, O2 can detect
25.30% of feature space adversarial samples but at the cost
of a 19.20% false positive rate2. The results show that O2
is ineffective against feature space attack.
case, however, we are able to evade the detection method without
knowing its existence or mechanism.
2The parameters used for ImageNet are not given in the orig-
inal paper. We can only reduce to this false positive rate after
parameter tuning.
Table 3: Evaluation of adversarial attacks against various
defense approaches.
Attack
SVHN CIFAR-10
Adaption Madry TRADES Pixel-DP 3
None 84.84 77.84 84.97 44.3
PGD 52.84 41.43 54.02 30.7
Decoder 84.81 77.35 84.01 50.0
Feature Space 2.56 7.05 8.64 0.0
Attack
ImageNet
Denoise (t,1) Denoise (u,1) Denoise (u,5)
None 61.25 61.25 78.12
PGD 42.60 12.50 27.15
Decoder 64.68 64.00 82.37
Feature Space 11.41 1.25 1.25
Table 2 shows the results of Deep K Nearest Neighbour on
detecting different adversarial examples. Due to memory
limits, we only test on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The second
column denotes models employed for evaluation including
the default one used in the original paper (CNN+MLP).
The third column shows model accuracy on benign inputs.
The last two columns present detection rate on PGD and
feature space attacks. We can observe that DkNN has much
lower detection rate on feature space attack compared to
PGD, despite the fact that DkNN uses feature space data
for detecting adversarial samples.
4.3 Attack against Defense Approaches
We evaluate our feature space attack on 5 state-of-the-
art adversarial training approaches: Madry [Madry et al.,
2018], TRADES [Zhang et al., 2019], Denoise [Xie
et al., 2019], Adaption [Song et al., 2019], and Pixel-DP
[Lecuyer et al., 2019a]. For Denoise, the original paper
only evaluated on targeted attacks. We conduct experi-
ments on both targeted and untargeted attacks. We hence
use Denoise (t,1) to denote the top-1 accuracy of hardened
model on targeted attack and Denoise (u,5) the top-5 accu-
racy on untargeted attack. We launch the PGD `∞ attack
as well as our feature space attack on the four defense
approaches. The experimental results demonstrate the per-
formance of proposed feature space attack compared to
existing `-norm based pixel space attack. Table 3 demon-
strates the performance of adversarial attacks against vari-
ous defense approaches. The first column denotes attack
methods, where “None” presents the model accuracy on
benign inputs and “Decoder” denotes the samples directly
generated from the decoder without any feature space per-
turbation. The latter is to show that the Decoder can gen-
erate faithful and natural images from embeddings. The
following columns show different defense approaches (sec-
ond row) applied on various datasets (first row). We can
see that the PGD attack can reduce model accuracy to some
3Pixel-DP focuses on `2 norm. For the PGD attack, we use
`2 = 1 as the bound.
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Table 4: Performance of adversarially trained models
against different attacks.
Models
Accuracy
Normal PGD Feature Space
PGD Adv 87.3 43.7 0.2
Feature Space Adv 81.9 7.05 16.7
extent when defense mechanisms are considered. Feature
space attack, on the other hand, can effectively reduce
model accuracy down to less than 12%, and most results
are one order of magnitude smaller than PGD. Especially,
model accuracy on ImageNet is only 1.25% when using
untargeted attack, even in the presence of the defense tech-
nique. Interestingly, if images are generated directly from
the Decoder without any feature space perturbation, the
model accuracy improves on ImageNet. This indicates that
the trained Decoder indeed captures the content feature of
input images.
We study the `-norm distances in both the pixel space and
the feature space for both pixel space attacks and feature
space attacks. We observe that in the pixel space, the
introduced perturbation by feature space attack is much
larger than that of the PGD attack. However in the fea-
ture space, our attack has very similar distances as PGD.
Figure 1 and Figure 4 (in Appendix A.1) show that the
adversarial samples have only style differences that are
natural or even human imperceptible. Details can be found
in Appendix A.1.
We conducted an experiment to show that adversarial train-
ing in the pixel space does not improve model robustness
against feature space attack and vice versa. Details can be
found in Appendix A.1. We have also studied the charac-
teristics of the adversarial samples generated by different
feature space attacks and attack settings. Please see Ap-
pendix A.2.
4.4 Attack against Feature Space Adversarial
Training
To demonstrate the effectiveness of feature space attack,
we further evaluate on an adaptive defense, which utilizes
feature space attacks for adversarial training. We compare
the experimental results with the results of PGD adversar-
ial training in Table 4. The experiments are conducted on
CIFAR-10 and the models are adversarially trained for 100
epochs. The first column denotes the adversarially trained
models. The following three columns present the test accu-
racy on normal inputs, PGD and feature space adversarial
samples, respectively. We observe that adversarial training
on input space is only effective against input space attacks
(e.g., PGD). However, applying such defense to feature
space is ineffective against feature space attacks. This in-
dicates that attacks on feature space are potentially harder
to defend and defending them requires further study.
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Figure 3: Human preference evaluation. The left y-axis
(and blue bar) represents the percentage of user preference
towards feature space attack images. The right y-axis (and
orange line) denotes the test accuracy of models under
feature space attack. The x-axis presents the scale of fea-
ture space perturbation e in Equation 9. The horizontal
red line denotes where users cannot distinguish between
adversarial samples and original images.
4.5 Ablation and Human Study
In this section, we conduct a human study to measure the
quality of feature space attack samples. We follow the
same procedure as in [Zhang et al., 2016, Bhattad et al.,
2020]. Users are given 50 pairs of images, each pair con-
sisting of an original image and its transformed version (by
feature space attack). They are asked to choose the realistic
one from each pair. The images are randomly selected and
used in the following trials. Each pair appears on screen for
3 seconds, and is evaluated by exactly 10 users. Every user
has 5 chances for practice before the trials begin. In total,
110 users completed the study. We repeat the same study
for different feature space attack scales on ResNet-50 as
shown in Figure 3. On average, 41.9% of users choose our
adversarial samples over original images. This indicates
that the feature space attack is largely imperceptible to
human.
We also carry out a set of human studies to qualitatively
measure images generated by different attacks: PGD
[Madry et al., 2018], feature space attack and semantic
attack [Bhattad et al., 2020]. The results are shown in
Table 5. The first column shows the two attacks in compar-
ison. The second column presents the human preference
rate. The third column is the attack success rate. The
attacks are conducted on Denoise(t,1) defense in the top
sub-table, and on ResNet-50 in the bottom sub-table. We
observe that the quality of feature space attack samples
is comparable to that of PGD attack and the former has
a higher attack success rate. Feature space attack also
outperforms semantic attack when both achieve the same
success rate. That is, 67% users prefer feature space attack
samples to semantic attack samples. Generated images by
both attacks can Please see Appendix A.3.
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Table 5: Human preference and success rate for different
attacks.
Pref. Succ.
PGD 60 58
Feature Space 40 88
Pref. Succ.
Semantic 33 100
Feature Space 67 100
5 Conclusions
We propose feature space adversarial attack on DNNs. It
is based on perturbing style features and retaining content
features. Such attacks inject natural style changes to in-
put images to cause model misclassification. Since they
usually cause substantial pixel space perturbations and ex-
isting detection/defense techniques are mostly for bounded
pixel space attacks, these techniques are not effective for
feature space attacks.
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A Appendix
A.1 Measurement of Perturbation in Pixel and Feature Spaces
To measure the magnitude of perturbation introduced by adversarial attacks, we use both `∞ and `2 distances. In
addition, as we aim to understand how the different attacks perturb the pixel space and the feature space, we compute
the distances for both spaces. For the pixel space, the calculation is discussed in section 2. For the feature space, we
normalize the embeddings before distance calculation. For each channel, we use h(x) = f(x)−µf(x)σf(x) to normalize
the embedding produced by the Encoder f(·) given input x. The feature space difference hence can be computed as
||h(x)−h(x′)||p. Table 6, Table 8 and Table 9 illustrate the magnitude of perturbation introduced by adversarial attacks
on pixel and feature spaces for different hardened models. It can be observed that in the pixel space, the introduced
perturbation by feature space attack is much larger than that of the PGD attack with `∞ and `2 distances. In the feature
space, however, our feature space attack does not induce large difference between normal inputs and adversarial samples.
Particularly, the difference is similar or even smaller than that by the PGD attack. We further investigate the feature
space distance between feature space adversarial samples and the corresponding normal images of their target labels.
The `∞ and `2 distances are 24.24 and 890 on the hardened (targeted) ImageNet model respectively, which are much
larger than those (9.99 and 283) between the adversarial samples and the original (attacked) images. This indicates that
feature space attack indeed leverages abstract features for generating adversarial samples. As shown in Figure 1 and
Figure 4, the introduced perturbation is either insensitive to humans or even imperceptible.
We further explore the space targeted by different adversarial attacks using adversarial training. The assumption
is that models hardened using an attack method are resilient to adversarial samples generated by the same attack
method. Specifically, we use a CIFAR-10 model hardened by PGD as the base model. We then employ different attack
approaches to generate adversarial samples against this base model on both the training and validation sets. For each
attack approach, we further retrain the base model using the corresponding adversarial samples. Finally, we test the
performance of the retrained model on different adversarial samples from the validation set. Table 7 presents the results.
Each row represents the model retrained using the corresponding adversarial samples on the training set, where FA is
feature augmentation attack and FI feature interpolation attack. Each column denotes the test on adversarial samples
generated on the validation set. We observe that retraining on the PGD attack does not improve model robustness
against feature space attacks and vice versa. It indicates that the PGD attack and feature space attack exploit different
spaces in generating adversarial samples.
Table 6: Magnitude of perturbation on hardened
SVHN models.
Attack
Pixel Space Feature Space
l∞ l2 l∞ l2
PGD 0.02 1.04 11.50 53.78
Decoder 0.08 1.05 10.12 36.52
Feature Space 0.12 2.01 10.51 41.83
Table 7: Model accuracy of adversarially trained mod-
els in different attack spaces.
Model PGD FA FI
PGD 72.18 55.31 57.96
FA 54.68 84.06 75.31
FI 46.56 60.93 87.81
Table 8: Magnitude of perturbation on hardened CIFAR-10 models.
Attack
Madry TRADES
Pixle Space Feature Space Pixle Space Feature Space
`∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2
PGD 0.03 1.51 6.86 41.71 0.03 1.47 6.49 37.89
Decoder 0.19 1.85 4.29 25.13 0.18 1.85 4.30 25.15
Feature Space 0.27 4.08 6.88 43.38 0.28 4.72 7.43 46.43
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Table 9: Magnitude of perturbation on hardened ImageNet models.
Attack
Targeted Untargeted
Pixle Space Feature Space Pixle Space Feature Space
`∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2 `∞ `2
PGD 0.06 19.48 12.08 375 0.03 9.24 16.91 227
Decoder 0.87 44.98 8.26 193 0.88 44.67 15.24 214
Feature Space 0.89 69.07 9.99 283 0.86 54.89 16.09 236
A.2 Two Feature Space Attacks
We generate and visually analyze the two feature space attacks. The ImageNet model hardened by feature denoising is
used for generating adversarial samples. Columns (a), (d), and (g) in Figure 4 present the original images. Columns (b),
(c), and (d) present the adversarial samples generate by the Encoder and the corresponding Decoder, with different
encoder depths. Specifically, column (b) uses conv2_1 layers, column (c) uses conv3_1 layers and column (d) uses
conv4_1 layers of a pre-trained VGG-19 as the Encoder, and the Decoders are of neural network structure similar to the
corresponding Encoders but in a reverse order. Observe that as the Encoder becomes deeper, object outlines and textures
are changed in addition to colors. Columns (e) and (f) are adversarial samples generated by the feature argumentation
attack (FA) and feature interpolation attack (FI). We observe that they both generate realistic images.
In column (h), we only perturb the mean of embedding whereas in column (i) we only perturb the standard deviation
of embedding. The results indicate that mean values tend to represent the background and the overall color tone. In
contrast, the standard deviations tend to represent the object shape and relative color.
Figure 4: The adversarial samples from different feature space attack methods.
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A.3 Comparison with Semantic Attack
Some examples used in human study for comparing between feature space attack and semantic attack are shown in
Figure 5. The top row presents original images. The middle row shows adversarial images generated by feature space
attack. The bottom row denotes adversarial samples produced by semantic attack. We can observe that adversarial
samples generated by feature space attack look more natural.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 5: Examples by feature space attack and semantic attack. The top row presents original images. The middle row
shows adversarial images generated by feature space attack. The bottom row denotes adversarial samples produced by
semantic attack.
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